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CRIMINAL LAW 
AMERICAN POLICING AT A CROSSROADS: 
UNSUSTAINABLE POLICIES AND THE 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE ALTERNATIVE 
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER,* TOM R. TYLER** & AZIZ Z. 
HUQ***
As victimization rates have fallen, public preoccupation with policing 
and its crime-control impact has receded.  Terrorism has become the new 
focal point of concern.  But satisfaction with ordinary police practices hides 
deep problems.  The time is therefore ripe for rethinking the assumptions 
that have guided American police for most of the past two decades.  This 
Article proposes an empirically-grounded shift to what we call a 
procedural justice model of policing.  When law enforcement moves toward 
this approach, it can be more effective at lower cost and without the 
negative side effects that currently hamper responses to terrorism and 
conventional crime.  This Article describes the procedural justice model, 
explains its theoretical and empirical foundations, and discusses its policy 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As victimization rates have fallen, public preoccupation with policing 
and its crime control impact has receded.  Terrorism has become the new 
focal point of public concern.  But the apparent satisfaction with ordinary 
police practices hides deep problems. 
Public order successes have been achieved at great cost to politically 
powerless communities.  As the controversy surrounding the recent arrest of 
Harvard Professor Henry Louis Gates illustrated,1 our laws and the way 
they are enforced have resulted in public attitudes sharply polarized along 
racial lines,2 a division that is scarcely surprising in a nation marked by 
conspicuous racial disparities in its prison populations.3  And the costs of 
current strategic choices are no longer confined to minorities and the poor.  
Through its criminogenic impact, imprisonment has cross-cutting effects for 
the wider population, promising safety through deterrence at the same time 
as it increases victimization at the hands of former inmates.4
 
1 Gates was arrested at his Cambridge home by a police officer who suspected him of a 
house break-in.  Though circumstances were disputed, many whites assumed the officer 
would not have acted without good reason, while others (especially blacks) found it unlikely 
that a middle-aged professor, standing on the porch of his own home, would have been 
viewed with suspicion and then arrested if he had been white.  See CAMBRIDGE REVIEW 
COMM., MISSED OPPORTUNITIES, SHARED RESPONSIBILITIES: FINAL REPORT OF THE 
CAMBRIDGE REVIEW COMMITTEE 16–21 (June 2010) [hereinafter CAMBRIDGE REVIEW 
COMMITTEE], available at http://www.cambridgema.gov/CityOfCambridge_Content/
documents/Cambridge Review_FINAL.pdf; Cambridge Police Dep’t, Incident Report 
# 9005127, July 16, 2009, available at http://www.samefacts.com/archives/ 
Police report on Gates arrest.PDF (detailing the officer’s account); Dayo Olopade, Skip 
Gates Speaks, ROOT (July 21, 2009), http://www.theroot.com/views/ 
skip-gates-speaks?page=0,1 (for Gates’s view). 
  These costs 
are compounded by fiscal consequences that are now impossible to ignore.  
In California, reliance on long-term imprisonment as a crime-control 
2 In one careful survey, less than twenty percent of African Americans considered the 
American legal system fair.  Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: Criminal 
Enforcement and Perceptions of Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 S. CALIF. L. REV. 
1219, 1247 (2000).  After President Obama criticized the officer’s actions, a poll found that 
twice as many whites as blacks disapproved of the President’s comments.  See PEW 
RESEARCH CTR., OBAMA’S RATINGS SLIDE ACROSS THE BOARD 15–17 (2009), available at 
http://people-press.org/report/532/obamas-ratings-slide. Similar findings recur throughout 
the literature. 
3 See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN AN 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (rev. ed. 2006). 
4 See, e.g., Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520, 2009 WL 2430820, at *84 
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (“[T]he state’s continued failure to address the severe crowding in 
California’s prisons would perpetuate a criminogenic prison system that itself threatens 
public safety.”), appeal docketed sub nom Schwarzenegger v. Plata, 130 S. Ct. 3413 (2010); 
Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West & Jan Holland, Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarceration 
in New York City Neighborhoods, 30 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1551, 1554 (2003). 
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strategy has choked off funds for education and pushed the state to the brink 
of insolvency.5  Budget imperatives are forcing the state to reduce its prison 
population by 6,500 inmates, even in the face of recidivism rates of nearly 
40%, among the highest in the nation.6  One prisoner brought home the 
dilemma and triggered widespread alarm when he was released early but 
then promptly re-arrested for attempted rape.7  In other places, incarceration 
policies generate fiscal burdens that, if less dire, are nonetheless patently 
unsustainable.8  Highly stretched police forces from New York City to 
Tulsa, Oakland, Los Angeles, and elsewhere are facing cuts in personnel, 
even in their high priority units.9
The pressures have become especially acute because we can no longer 
subordinate conventional law enforcement to the newer preoccupation with 
terrorism.  That domain was long seen as far removed from everyday 
policing.  But government measures in this once-distant arena increasingly 




5 See, e.g., Wyatt Buchanan, Has the Golden State Gone Bankrupt?, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 
22, 2010, at A1, available at 
  And, as we discuss 
http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-02-22/news/
17950763_1_bankruptcy-treasurer-bill-lockyer-golden-state; Larry Gordon, Gale Holland & 
Mitchell Landsberg, Lowered Expectations for Model of Higher Education, L.A. TIMES, July 
31, 2009, at A1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/31/local/me-college-cuts31. 
6 Randal C. Archibold, Driven to a Fiscal Brink, A State Throws Open The Doors to Its 
Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2010, at A14.  In a 2005 analysis, the three-year recidivism 
rate for California offenders released from incarceration and returned to prison or jail after 
conviction for new crimes was 37%.  An additional 32% of released offenders were returned 
to custody for technical parole violations.  See Ryan G. Fischer, Are California’s Recidivism 
Rates Really the Highest in the Nation?  It Depends on What Measure of Recidivism You 
Use, THE BULLETIN, UC Irvine Center for Evidence-Based Corrections, Sept. 2005, at 2, 
available at http://ucicorrections.seweb.uci.edu/pdf/bulletin_2005_vol-1_is-1.pdf. 
7 Archibold, supra note 6, at A14. 
8 See, e.g., Nicholas Riccardi, Laws Loosen to Free Inmates, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2009, 
at A20 (discussing states where cost constraints have forced prison releases; Kentucky 
granted early release to 3,000 inmates). 
9 See, e.g., Joel Rubin, LAPD Cuts Killed Terrorism Unit, L.A. TIMES, May 6, 2010, at 
AA3; Maya Rao, N.J. Layoffs Grow in Public Sector, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 13, 2010, at 
B04 (describing police force cuts in New Jersey); Nicole Marshall, TPD Making Fewer 
Arrests, TULSA WORLD, Mar. 28, 2010, at A1 (describing layoffs of 124 Tulsa police 
officers); Bobby White, Cuts to Police Force Test a Safer Oakland, WALL ST. J., July 11, 
2009, at A4 (describing decision to lay off nearly 20% of Oakland police force and similar 
cuts throughout California and other states); cf. David W. Chen & Javier C. Hernandez, 
Putting Blame on Albany, Mayor Unveils Budget With Heavy Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 
2010, at A22 (describing a budget-driven plan to cut 892 police officers, later reversed—at 
the expense of teachers and other city employees—after the failed Times Square bombing 
plot); David Seifman & Dan Mangan, A Cop Priority Thanks to Thug—NYPD Spared 
Slashes After Terrorist Bust, N.Y. POST, May 6, 2010, at 4 (same). 
10 See TO PROTECT AND TO SERVE: POLICING IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (David Weisburd 
et al. eds., 2009); Matthew C. Waxman, Police and National Security: American Local Law 
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below, the local policing practices currently favored in much of America 
not only have hidden costs for effective crime prevention but also can 
directly undermine sound responses to the threat of terrorism. 
The time is ripe, therefore, for rethinking the assumptions that have 
guided American police for most of the past two decades.  Zero-tolerance 
policies and the order-maintenance model, as well as their various cousins, 
for all of their apparent success must be reoriented to make room for 
different priorities.  We see no need for a radical restructuring of the police 
function, but what we propose is nonetheless a significant shift in emphasis, 
a shift to what we call a procedural justice model of policing. 
The procedural justice approach is grounded in empirical research 
demonstrating that compliance with the law and willingness to cooperate 
with enforcement efforts are primarily shaped not by the threat of force or 
the fear of consequences, but rather by the strength of citizens’ beliefs that 
law enforcement agencies are legitimate.  And that belief in turn is shaped 
by the extent to which police behavior displays the attributes of procedural 
justice—practices, described in more detail below, which generate 
confidence that policies are formulated and applied fairly so that, regardless 
of material outcomes, people believe they are treated respectfully and 
without discrimination.  When policing approaches the procedural justice 
model, law enforcement can be even more effective at lower cost and 
without the negative side effects that currently hamper our responses to 
international terrorism.  Indeed, the procedural justice model has direct 
relevance for the development of successful strategies within that domain 
itself. 
In Part II of this Article, we situate the procedural justice approach by 
reviewing the principles that inform the police function and the ways they 
have changed over recent decades.  Part III describes the procedural justice 
model and explains its theoretical and empirical foundations.  Part IV 
focuses on concrete policy implications for ordinary policing and for efforts 
to combat international terrorism.  Part V offers concluding thoughts. 
II. CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF THE POLICE FUNCTION 
A. GOALS AND PRINCIPLES 
From their beginnings in the early 1800s and for more than a century 
thereafter, urban police in America were a politically attuned branch of 
municipal government, charged not only with preserving order but also with 
relaying citizen requests for city services and delivering benefits to 
 
Enforcement and Counter-terrorism After 9/11, 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 377, 385–
91 (2009).  
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constituents at the precinct and ward levels.11  As American cities 
mushroomed in size and density and as local political machines flourished, 
the police, deeply engaged in collecting and distributing patronage, 
occasionally brutal and often corrupt, became an indispensable arm of the 
ruling establishment.12  The title of one scholarly study summed it up: 
Police: Streetcorner Politicians.13  The dilemma of “law enforcement in a 
democratic society”14—the need not only to endow officials with authority 
to deploy deadly force but also to preserve democratic control—precipitated 
a “preoccupation with legitimacy.”15
The solution that began to emerge in the 1950s, prominently endorsed 
in 1967 by the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the 
Administration of Justice, was professionalization.
 
16  Henceforth, police 
were to be organized and managed as a highly-trained civil service devoted 
to crime control, and were designed to be “insular, homogeneous, and 
largely autonomous,” with guarantees of independence from politics, and 
“purposely distanced” from the communities they were assigned to 
protect.17  The importance of gaining and holding the community’s trust 
was widely acknowledged, and police leaders typically assumed that trust 
would flow from legitimacy.  But legitimacy came to be identified with 
professional norms, a military style of leadership, and a detached, reactive 
mode in which officers responded when called for help but deliberately kept 
their distance from individuals in the local community.18
The professional model bolstered one sort of democratic legitimacy—
political independence—but undermined another—the authority grounded 
in the needs and preferences of the polity itself.  Just at a time when broad 
 
 
11 See Eric Monkkonen, History of Urban Police, 15 CRIME & JUST. 547, 549–52 (1992).  
In Britain, where modern policing originated in 1829 at the behest of Sir Robert Peel, the 
emphasis was different, and the police function was not embedded in municipal politics.  See 
generally WILBUR R. MILLER, COPS AND BOBBIES: POLICE AUTHORITY IN NEW YORK AND 
LONDON (1999). 
12 See generally JONATHAN RUBINSTEIN, CITY POLICE (1973); M. Craig Brown & Barbara 
D. Warner, Immigrants, Urban Politics, and Policing in 1900, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 293 (1992). 
13 WILLIAM KER MUIR, JR., POLICE: STREETCORNER POLITICIANS 271 (1977) (describing 
this phenomenon but by no means endorsing it). 
14 JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC 
SOCIETY (1966). 
15 See DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 93 (2008) (discussing 
“[t]he [p]reoccupation with [l]egitimacy”). 
16 See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE 
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967). 
17 SKLANSKY, supra note 15, at 6. 
18 Id. at 93–94. 
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grassroots authenticity was becoming the hallmark of democracy,19 police 
were reaching for an elite mantle of detached expertise.20
Two adjustments were brought to bear.  One was substantive: the due 
process model through which the Warren and Burger Courts reaffirmed 
constraints on law enforcement power and insisted that they be enforced not 
only by the police bureaucracy but also by an independent judiciary.
  Once again, their 
legitimacy suffered. 
21
The other adjustment was strategic.  Emphasizing concepts like 
“community policing” or “problem-oriented policing,” law enforcement 
priorities were recalibrated.
 
22  Police effort henceforth would be guided (or 
would claim to be guided) by the expressed preferences of “the 
community,” as revealed in listening sessions at the grassroots and meetings 
with acknowledged or self-proclaimed community leaders.23
A related model with a significantly different emphasis, “order-
maintenance policing” made it a priority for police to address local 
problems, even those that did not rise to the level of grave crimes.
 
24  Its 
widely accepted watchword was that “‘[b]roken windows’ do need to be 
repaired quickly.”25
 
19 See David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1756–62 
(2005) [hereinafter Sklansky, Police and Democracy] (describing the movement in favor of 
participatory democracy in the 1960s and 1970s). 
  Unlike many versions of community-oriented policing, 
however, some versions of the order-maintenance approach assigned to the 
police themselves the responsibility for identifying disorder.  Another 
conception of reform went a step further, from maintaining order to 
eliminating all forms of disorder.  Its message was zero tolerance: even 
20 See Mark Harrison Moore, Problem-solving and Community Policing, in MODERN 
POLICING 99, 117 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1992) (noting that police “became 
cut off from the aspirations, desires, and concerns of citizens”).  
21 See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 379–411 
(2000) (summarizing case law); cf. Sklansky, Police and Democracy, supra note 19, at 1749 
(noting criticism of Warren Court precedents). 
22 See generally JEROME H. SKOLNICK & DAVID H. BAYLEY, THE NEW BLUE LINE (1986) 
(describing police innovation in six American cities); id. at 10–11 (noting “the beginnings of 
a social reconstruction of American policing” and “a strong inclination to recognize the 
significance of community trust and cooperation”); id. at 211 (characterizing the new 
approach as “community-oriented policing”). 
23 See generally Moore, supra note 20; Jerome Skolnick & David Bayley, Theme and 
Variation in Community Policing, 10 CRIME & JUST. 1 (1988).  Despite its many purely 
cosmetic features, the community policing movement also wrought many real and important 
changes.  See David Alan Sklansky, The Persistent Pull of Police Professionalism (July 
2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).  
24 GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING 
ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 160 (1996). 
25 WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN 
AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 75 (1990). 
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minor misconduct was to be systematically suppressed.  Legitimacy would 
come not from participatory democracy but from effectiveness; police 
authority would be accepted and respected because it would achieve results. 
Thus, for more than half a century, achieving and maintaining 
“legitimacy” has been a central preoccupation both for those who support 
law enforcement and for those who want to constrain it.  But legitimacy has 
been understood in sharply different terms: alternatively constitutional 
(compliance with the rule of law), political (governance in conformity with 
community preferences), or instrumental (success in reducing crime).  The 
politically-charged disagreements have produced profound transformations, 
but one thing largely missing from the debates has been any effort to define 
precisely what “legitimacy” means or how to measure it empirically.  
Instead, an apparent consensus about the importance of police legitimacy 
has masked radically different assumptions about what that is and how it 
can be achieved. 
Conceptual ambiguity and a failure to study empirical data bearing on 
issues of broad policing strategy are mirrored in conclusory debates about 
appropriate tactics for individual officers on the street.  The debates, 
roughly speaking, center on competing preferences for being tough or being 
fair. 
B. TACTICAL CHOICES: TOUGHNESS VERSUS FAIRNESS 
Tough cops are not automatically unfair, and civil libertarians are not 
automatically soft, but being tough and being fair are often assumed to be in 
tension.  A perception that police must to choose between them arises 
almost everywhere in policing and in criminal law generally: street stops, 
surveillance, Miranda rights, and so on.  In each instance, some people feel 
sure that social protection requires police powers that are unconstrained by 
procedural niceties, and others are equally convinced that harsh measures, if 
insensitive to individual rights, will prove counterproductive. 
A similar argument arises in areas far outside of criminal justice.  
During the Vietnam War, the issue was framed as a debate about whether 
we should burn down villages sympathetic to the Viet Cong or focus 
instead on winning hearts and minds.26  The same dilemma is now one of 
our military’s biggest preoccupations in Iraq and Afghanistan.27
 
26 The debate is vividly presented in the 1974 documentary film Hearts and Minds, 
directed by Peter Davis.  HEARTS AND MINDS (BBS Productions & Rainbow Releasing 
1974); see also Elizabeth Dickinson, A Bright Shining Slogan, FOREIGN POL’Y, Sept./Oct. 
2009, at 29. 
  A 
commentator who admires former President George W. Bush recently 
27 See, e.g., Lara M. Dadkhah, Empty Skies over Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2010, 
at A27. 
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stated that we must “project global power and military might [or else our] 
hegemony will be challenged.”28  A recent op-ed in the New York Times 
derided our focus on hearts and minds in Afghanistan, arguing that it was 
more important to kill members of the Taliban than to worry about civilian 
casualties.29  General Charles Krulak, a former commandant of the Marine 
Corps, takes exactly the opposite view.  He claims that the United States 
military must use power sparingly because “the fundamental precept of 
counterinsurgency” is to “[u]ndermine the enemy’s legitimacy while 
building our own.”30
Many Americans have little doubt that in each of these areas the tough 
approach, whatever its moral drawbacks, at least will make them safer.
 
31
For police officers, toughness has not always been preferred.  In the 
early days of modern urban policing, British Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel 
stressed that “[t]he police must secure the willing cooperation of the public” 
and that “[p]olice should use physical force . . . only when the exercise of 
persuasion, advice, and warning is found to be insufficient.”
  
Another group feels equally sure that being tough can be counterproductive.  
The impact of toughness on effectiveness may be the most fundamental 
question in the whole field of social conflict and social control.  Though the 
question is undeniably empirical, it is rarely treated as such; across the 
political spectrum, nearly everyone assumes that it can be answered on the 
basis of confident intuitions about the essence of human nature. 
32  Yet in more 
recent times, a preference for toughness has long held sway.  Indeed, 
toughness has often been defended as beneficial for everyone.  Police 
scholar William Muir described the mindset of police who believed that 
“[t]he nastier one’s reputation, the less nasty one has to be.”33
 
28 Nile Gardiner, Bush Demonstrates That Hard Power Matters, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Dec. 
27, 2008, at 33. 
  Skolnick and 
Fyfe observe the prevalence of the same way of thought, adding that 
“[c]ops and everyone else understand the reality of this paradox.  And 
29 Dadkhah, supra note 27, at A27.  
30 Charles C. Krulack & Joseph P. Hoar, Fear Was No Excuse To Condone Torture, 
MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 11, 2009, at 25A.  
31 See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700–01 (2009) (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 
480 U.S. 340, 352–53 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted); City of Chicago v. 
Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (plurality opinion) (discussing Chicago crackdown on “gang-
loitering”); Dadkhah, supra note 27, at A27 (arguing for aggressive use of airpower in 
Afghanistan); John F. Harris, Mike Allen & Jim VandeHei, Cheney Warns of New Attacks, 
POLITICO (Feb. 4, 2009, 6:12 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0209/18390.html. 
32 JOHN S. DEMPSEY & LINDA S. FORST, AN INTRODUCTION TO POLICING 8 (5th ed. 2010). 
33 MUIR, supra note 13, at 41, 44, 101. 
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whether or not they actually articulate it, cops develop styles of policing in 
response to it.”34
The instinctive preference of the cop on the beat using the tough 
approach to policing style was potentially in tension with the notion that 
police agencies should be “problem-oriented” or “community based.”
 
35  But 
that tension dissolved in certain versions of the “order-maintenance” 
approach, which emphasized aggressive street stops, along with “proactive 
enforcement of misdemeanor laws and zero tolerance for minor offenses.”36  
In their seminal “Broken Windows” essay, Wilson and Kelling described 
the perspective of departments that made it a priority to prevent low-level 
disorder on the streets: “In the words of one officer, ‘We kick ass.’”37  A 
Chicago police officer who was “not prepared to stand by and watch gangs 
terrorize his family, friends, and neighbors” described “how he dealt with 
gang members who would not follow his orders: ‘I say please once, I say 
please twice, and then I knock them on their ass.’”38
Even where police advocates of “community policing” were not 
committed to zero-tolerance or aggressive tactics, meetings with 
neighborhood groups evolved from the orientation required in community-
based models—a reciprocal problem-solving conversation—into “a bland, 
one-sided, impersonal opportunity for city bureaucrats to manufacture 
consent” for measures they had already decided to implement.
 
39
Although early assessments suggested that various order-maintenance 
approaches were “working” (i.e., reducing crime), more careful analysis 
revealed that aggressive street-level enforcement focused on quality-of-life 




34 JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE 
USE OF FORCE 95 (1993).  Skolnick and Fyfe are quick to note, however, that the tough style 
is not always successful.  Id. 
  Where genuine crime-control 
35 See SKLANSKY, supra note 15, at 4, 123. 
36 BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN 
WINDOWS POLICING 2 (2001). 
37 James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and 
Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, March 1982, at 29. 
38 KELLING & COLES, supra note 24, at 166. 
39 See William Lyons, Partnerships, Information and Public Safety, 25 POLICING INT’L J. 
POLICE STRAT. & MGMT 530, 534 (2002) (describing Seattle experience); cf. WESLEY G. 
SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNETT, COMMUNITY POLICING, CHICAGO STYLE 113–14 (1997) 
(describing the interactive nature of Chicago’s community policing program “beat 
meetings”). 
40 See HARCOURT, supra note 36, at 6–11, 59–121; see also Hubert Williams & Antony 
M. Pate, Returning to First Principles: Reducing the Fear of Crime in Newark, 33 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 53, 67 (1986) (noting that order-maintenance policies in Newark failed to achieve 
their goals); Frank Zimring, The City that Became Safe: New York and the Future of Crime 
Control, SCI. AM. (forthcoming August 2011) (manuscript on file with authors). 
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successes have been achieved, they seem attributable, at best, only to 
discrete, narrowly targeted programs that are unrelated (or antithetical) to 
order-maintenance enforcement of low-level crimes.41  Similarly, research 
does not support the widely held belief that police are always wise to seek 
to dominate situations by force; when police react to perceived threats by 
displaying force, their actions often escalate the conflict.42
How could it be that energetic policing, with a high volume of street 
stops, searches, and arrests, was not helping to reduce crime or protect 
officer safety?  One place to look for a possible answer is the tradition that 
sees the legitimacy of official authority not through the lens of 
constitutional law, politics, or economic efficiency, but rather from the 
perspective of empirical social psychology. 
  
C. LEGITIMACY AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTRIBUTE 
The psychological model of legitimacy posits that people obey the law, 
irrespective of expected rewards and penalties, when they view the 
government as worthy of trust and respect.  This model’s theoretical 
foundation is found in the work of Max Weber, who argued that legitimacy 
in this psychological sense was the key to the effectiveness of the state.43  
People must believe “that some decision . . . is entitled to be obeyed by 
virtue of who made the decision or how it was made.”44
In the context of criminal justice, a large body of research confirms the 
links between perceived legitimacy and willingness to obey the law.  To be 
sure, potential criminals are sometimes influenced by straightforward 
material incentives.  People who steal cars or rob banks often take into 
account the chances of getting caught.  There is much evidence that 
criminals can be influenced to commit their crimes at different times or 
 
 
41 See Zimring, supra note 40, at 30 (arguing that crime-control successes in New York 
City cannot be attributed to aggressive quality-of-life law enforcement, that in fact the 
NYPD, its rhetoric notwithstanding, de-emphasized this tactic, and that at most only one 
aspect of New York’s aggressive street-stops approach (the targeting of certain “hot-spots”) 
may be responsible for New York’s crime-control gains).  
42 JOHN D. MCCLUSKEY, POLICE REQUESTS FOR COMPLIANCE: COERCIVE AND 
PROCEDURALLY JUST TACTICS 171 (2003).  
43 MAX WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 336 (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward 
Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., 1954) (noting that "every domination . . . always has the 
strongest need of self-justification through appealing to the principles of legitimation"); id. at 
341 (describing legitimacy as prestige resting on beliefs of members of a political 
community). 
44 Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. 
REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 377 (2006). 
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places.  And sometimes potential sanctions induce them to commit the 
offenses less frequently or not at all.45
But research also finds strong support for the psychological legitimacy 
model.  In many situations, people obey the law not because of fear of 
getting caught but simply because they view the legal authorities as 
legitimate and believe that legitimate authorities should be obeyed.
 
46  
Perceived legitimacy is assessed by asking people to express their degree of 
faith in various public institutions, as measured by their belief that officials 
are trustworthy, concerned about the welfare of those with whom they deal, 
able to protect citizens against crime, and otherwise do their jobs well.47  
People who express a high degree of confidence in public authorities 
comply with the law either because of social influence (they want to avoid 
the disapproval of their social group) or because of internalized moral 
norms (they want to see themselves as decent people who do the right 
thing).48  Legitimacy thus enables authorities to maintain social order 
almost automatically, without incurring the heavy costs required by 
instrumental strategies relying on arrest, adjudication, and incarceration.49
How can the police build this valuable attribute of legitimacy?  
Empirical research indicates that this sort of legitimacy is sustained not by 
an aggressive style that subordinates individual rights but rather by 
something closer to its opposite—practices that can be grouped under the 
heading of procedural justice. 
 
III. THE PROCEDURAL JUSTICE MODEL 
The procedural justice concept captures the fairness of the process 
used to make and apply rules and the quality of the personal treatment 
 
45 Daniel Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First 
Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 12–15 (1998) (summarizing studies on the effect of sanctions 
on criminal deterrence). 
46 See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 59 (rev. ed. 2006) [hereinafter TYLER, 
WHY PEOPLE OBEY]; cf. Clemens Kroneberg, Isolde Heintze & Guido Mehlkop, The 
Interplay of Moral Norms and Instrumental Incentives in Crime Causation, 48 
CRIMINOLOGY 259, 283 (2010) (suggesting that although normative mechanisms are more 
important, some people only respond to incentives). 
47 See Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help 
the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 270–71 (2008). 
48 See Kroneberg, Heintze & Mehlkop, supra note 46, at 259 (using survey data to 
determine the influence of different factors upon compliance); Paul H. Robinson & John M. 
Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 468 (1997) (summarizing research that 
indicates an alternative explanation for obedience of the law because “fear of arrest and 
incarceration in prison is not effective in causing people to obey the law”). 
49 See Tom R. Tyler, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: The Benefits of Self-Regulation, 7 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 307, 309 (2009) [hereinafter Tyler, Legitimacy] (reviewing literature to 
this effect). 
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people receive from authorities.50
Conventional wisdom posits that the primary issue for people dealing 
with legal authorities is the outcome of the interaction.  It is assumed, for 
example, that when a driver receives a traffic ticket, he is likely to be upset, 
but that if the encounter ends without issuance of a ticket, the driver is more 
likely to be happy.  But empirical research tells a different story.  An 
extensive body of data demonstrates that while people are happier when 
they do not receive an unfavorable result such as a traffic ticket, the 
principal factor shaping their reactions is whether law enforcement officials 
exercise authority in ways that are perceived to be fair.
  Perceived fairness in decisionmaking has 
been found to be determined by such matters as whether police are viewed 
as unbiased and consistent and whether they give people opportunities to be 
heard before they take action.  Perceived fairness of treatment, the research 
shows, is determined by such matters as whether police are courteous and 
respectful of people and their rights. 
51  This is true for 
both those who do and those who do not receive the unfavorable result.  
These findings have been replicated using a wide array of methodologies 
such as field research, panel studies, and experimental studies in “dozens of 
social, legal, and organizational contexts.”52
The implications of this research for policing tactics are obvious but 
seldom appreciated. When police ramp up their arrest rates for low-level 
offenses like vandalism and vagrancy, the broken windows hypothesis 





50 See TOM R. TYLER, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE DESIGN OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 36–43 
(2007); Jason A. Colquitt et al., Justice at the Millennium: A Meta-Analytic Review of 25 
Years of Organizational Justice, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 425, 426 (2001). 
  But opinion surveys often confound that expectation, 
51 See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING COOPERATION 
WITH THE POLICE AND THE LAW (2002); Kimberly Belvedere, John L. Worrall & Stephen G. 
Tibbetts, Explaining Suspect Resistance in Police-Citizen Encounters, 30 CRIM. JUST. REV. 
30 (2005); Ben Bradford, Jonathan Jackson & Elizabeth A. Stanko, Contact and Confidence: 
Revisiting the Impact of Public Encounters with the Police, 19 POLICING AND SOC’Y 20 
(2009); Jacinta M. Gau & Rod K. Brunson, Procedural Justice and Order Maintenance 
Policing: A Study of Inner-City Young Men’s Perceptions of Police Legitimacy, 27 JUST. Q. 
255 (2010); Lyn Hinds, Youth, Police Legitimacy and Informal Contact, 24 J. POLICE & 
CRIM. PSYCHOL. 10 (2009); Stephen D. Mastrofski, Jeffrey B. Snipes & Anne E. Supina, 
Compliance on Demand: The Public’s Response to Specific Police Requests, 33 J. RES. 
CRIME & DELINQ. 269 (1996); Michael D. Reisig & Meghan Stroshine Chandek, The Effects 
of Expectancy Disconfirmation on Outcome Satisfaction in Police-Citizen Encounters, 24 
POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 88 (2001); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural 
Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 431 (2003). 
52 Robert MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of 
Procedural Fairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 173 (2005). 
53 See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 301–10 (1996) 
(emphasizing “the sector of the black law-abiding population that desires more rather than 
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finding that where arrest rates for these offenses rise or where other 
“crackdown” tactics are implemented, approval of the police has declined.54
By contrast, toughness with fairness can be productive.  In a study that 
interviewed New Yorkers both prior to and following a personal experience 
with the police, people who received a traffic citation from an officer who 
treated them fairly tended to view the police as more legitimate and were 
significantly more willing to cooperate with the police than they had been 
before that encounter.
  
In light of the research we have canvassed, these results are not mysterious: 
tough measures, if implemented without fairness, are likely to arouse 
resentment rather than appreciation. 
55
The assumption that there is a zero-sum trade-off between individual 
rights and public safety is therefore far too simple.  When perceptions of 
procedural justice and legitimacy decline, people’s willingness to obey also 
declines, but when authorities build their legitimacy, people are more 
willing to comply with the law.
  As a result, the police can take actions to control 
crime and build legitimacy at the same time. 
56  And importantly, procedural fairness 
matters in similar ways for white, African-American, and Hispanic 
respondents, with only minor variations reflecting differences in the issues 
that are most salient to different ethnic groups.57
Few would argue that compliance can never be achieved in the 
absence of procedural justice.  Obedience can still be obtained, but only 
through intensive enforcement and harsh punishment.  And that route—the 
one America has largely followed since the 1960s—is not only expensive 
from the start, but it can also trigger a downward spiral.  Harsh repression 
enhances material incentives for compliance, but it weakens perceptions of 
 
 
less prosecution and punishment for all types of criminals”); Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. 
Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1169–70 (1998) 
(same). 
54 WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE 15, 118 (1990); Brooks, supra note 2, at 
1225. 
55 Tyler & Fagan, supra note 45, at 261. 
56 See Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy 
in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 555 (2003).  Some suggest 
that this line of argument glosses over a causal ambiguity: Citizens’ perceptions of 
procedural fairness may be “colored by [their] views about the legitimacy of the police or 
courts.”  David J. Smith, The Foundations of Legitimacy, in LEGITIMACY AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 29, 32–33 (T. Tyler et al. eds. 2007).  If so, 
perceived legitimacy may shape perceptions of procedural fairness, rather than the other way 
around.  The legitimacy research has used a variety of strategies to exclude this possibility.  
See, e.g., Tyler & Fagan, supra note 47, at 251 (using panel data to measure judgments of 
legitimacy and procedural justice before and after encounters with the police). 
57 See Tom R. Tyler, Policing in Black and White: Ethnic Group Differences in Trust 
and Confidence in the Police, 8 POLICE Q. 322, 336 (2005). 
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fairness and thus the willingness to comply voluntarily.  And that effect 
requires yet another increase in the use of aggressive enforcement 
measures, a step which in turn weakens voluntary compliance even more. 
Most of the research testing the legitimacy model has focused on 
willingness to violate the law.  But recent research also examines the links 
between procedural justice, legitimacy, and police capacity to secure 
cooperation from the general public.58




Yet in many low-income African-American and Hispanic 
neighborhoods, anti-snitching campaigns and other signs of mistrust make 
clear that, even where citizens are law-abiding and desperate to have safe 
neighborhoods, their cooperation with the police cannot be taken for 
granted.
  People who discover a criminal in hiding have to decide 
whether to report him.  When a crime is occurring, they have to make a 
similar decision.  They may also be asked to attend community meetings to 
discuss policing strategies or to participate in activities such as 
neighborhood watch.  In all these cases, police success in fighting crime 
depends upon public cooperation.  And cooperation is a more fragile 
commodity than compliance, because it is easy for people not to cooperate.  
Even when material incentives have only limited impact on behavior, they 
are far more likely to influence compliance than cooperation: When does a 
mere bystander face penalties for not reporting a crime or for not attending 
a community meeting?  People must want to cooperate with the police. 
60
The research on cooperation finds that willingness to assist the 
police—for example, by reporting suspicious behavior or by participating in 
crime prevention programs—is strongly linked to a person’s belief that 
police authority is legitimate.  And that belief is strong only when officials 
exercise their authority fairly.  Conversely, when perceptions of procedural 




58 See, e.g., Lyons, supra note 
  In 
one study, procedural fairness was more than twice as important for 
39; Tyler & Fagan, supra note 47; Tom R. Tyler, Stephen 
J. Schulhofer & Aziz Z. Huq, Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counter-Terrorism 
Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 365 (2010). 
59 See Robert J. Sampson, S. W. Raudenbush & F. Earls, Neighborhoods and Violent 
Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918 (1997). 
60 See Richard Delgado, Law Enforcement in Subordinated Communities: Innovation and 
Response, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1193 (2008). 
61 See Lyons, supra note 39, at 536, 538 (profiling and other tactics resented in minority 
communities “make it more difficult for citizens in those communities with the information 
we seek to communicate [it] effectively . . . .  Effective partnerships . . . only produce the 
desired forms of cooperation when they operate as a mechanism to increase understanding, 
trust and respect among the parties . . . .”). 
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securing cooperation as judgments about police competence or the fairness 
of outcomes.62
In short, an emphasis on fairness appears to be central to police 
success in maintaining social order.  Even though tough enforcement 
measures seem to increase an offender’s probability of apprehension and 
conviction, the net effect of tough measures can be the opposite, and not 
only because toughness tends to chill voluntary compliance.  Toughness 
also chills cooperation from the law-abiding community.  That reduced 
cooperation in turn decreases the probabilities of apprehension and 
conviction, and those effects in turn decrease even the involuntary 
compliance achieved through the threat of sanctions. 
 
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROCEDURAL JUSTICE MODEL 
In this Part, we discuss the implications of the procedural justice 
research for concrete policy measures in two areas of conventional 
policing—control of ordinary crime and control of misconduct by the police 
themselves.  We then turn to its implications for domestic counterterrorism 
policing. 
A. CONTROLLING ORDINARY CRIME 
Many zero-tolerance and order-maintenance models of policing, along 
with other instrumental approaches, emphasize efforts to control crime by 
increasing the density of police on the street and the frequency of street 
stops.  For example, over a three-year period, a Chicago initiative aimed at 
containing misbehavior by unruly youth and gang members led police to 
order over 89,000 individuals to disperse and resulted in the arrest of over 
42,000 people on charges of “gang loitering.”63  From 2003 to 2007, the 
number of street stops in New York City rose 500%, even though the crime 
rate was stable.64  And these stops were disproportionally concentrated 
among minority group members.65  Data from other jurisdictions show 
similar patterns.66
 
62 See Tyler, Legitimacy, supra note 
 
49, at 379–80 (comparing influence of perceived 
legitimacy and police effectiveness on willingness to cooperate). 
63 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 49–50 (1999) (plurality opinion). 
64 Jeffrey Fagan, Amanda Geller, Garth Davies & Valerie West, Street Stops and Broken 
Windows Revisited: The Demography and Logic of Proactive Policing in a Safe and 
Changing City, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING 309 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. 
White eds., 2010). 
65 See Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the New York City 
Police Department’s “Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. 
AM. STAT. ASS’N 813, 813–14 (2007) (finding that African-American and Hispanic 
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The procedural justice research described above suggests, however, 
that these efforts are likely to produce mixed or even counterproductive 
results.  If carefully targeted crackdown measures do indeed have some 
crime-control payoff, as may have been the case recently in New York 
City,67 and if such measures are therefore to be replicated and extended, it 
becomes particularly important to ensure that they are implemented wisely; 
the police departments that resort to them must exercise special care not to 
arouse resentment that offsets most of the expected benefits.  Even worse, 
to the extent that stop-and-search practices and frequent arrests for low-
level public-order offenses are seen as severe or racially selective, as they 
apparently are in many urban communities,68 these practices may actually 
impede compliance and voluntary cooperation with law enforcement.  
“[I]ntensive frisks and needless arrests can often be a source of friction,” 
thereby “undermining the very sense of legal legitimacy they were designed 
to foster.”69
The damage can be especially great when street sweeps and arrests for 
“loitering” bear down on youth who are perceived as threats to a well-
ordered community.  The views of children and adolescents about law and 
the courts are shaped by many factors, including parents, teachers, gangs, 




pedestrians in New York City were stopped more frequently than whites, even after 
controlling for race-specific estimates of criminal offending). 
  Because adult orientations 
toward the law are often formed during adolescence, these precursors of 
adult attitudes are crucial.  A considerable literature inspired by the broken 
windows hypothesis has posited that norms of law-abiding behavior can be 
nurtured by a strong law enforcement presence that exerts control over 
public spaces, stigmatizes gang membership, and drives disorderly youth 
66 In Los Angeles, for example, in 2003–2004 there were 4,569 stops per 10,000 African-
American residents, but only 1,750 stops per 10,000 white residents.  See IAN AYRES & 
JONATHAN BOROWSKY, A STUDY OF RACIALLY DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN THE LOS ANGELES 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 5–7 (2008), available at http://www.aclu-sc.org/documents/view/47. 
67 See Zimring, supra note 40. 
68 See supra text at notes 65–66. 
69 Reed Collins, Strolling While Poor: How Broken-Windows Policing Created a New 
Crime in Baltimore, 14 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 419, 426 (2007); see also Delgado, 
supra note 60, at 1202; K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden 
Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 
313 (2009). 
70 Jeffrey Fagan & Alex R. Piquero, Rational Choice and Developmental Influences on 
Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Offenders, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 715, 718–19  
(2007). 
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off the streets.71  Yet the empirical research canvassed here suggests the 
opposite—that intensive law enforcement and a readiness to arrest for low-
level offenses is far more likely to arouse resentment, weaken police 
legitimacy, and undermine voluntary compliance with the law.72
Tactics that emphasize procedural justice can be equally effective with 
fewer negative side effects.  In the procedural justice model, officers are not 
oriented toward addressing situations primarily with the threat of force.  
Instead, officers are trained to view every citizen contact as an opportunity 
to build legitimacy through the tone and quality of the interaction, with 
force a last resort. 
 
Although police leaders have long paid lip service to the importance of 
gaining community trust, concrete steps to further this goal were either 
nonexistent or (as in the community policing movement) centered on 
discussion forums largely divorced from the daily activity of the cop on the 
beat.  More recently, police departments across the country have begun to 
make more tangible efforts, but only in discrete programs of limited scope.  
An innovative Boston initiative engaged inner-city ministers and other 
community leaders in an effort to convince at-risk youth to steer clear of 
firearms.73  In High Point, North Carolina, police managed to shut down 
open-air drug markets by offering dealers a dignified opportunity to avoid 
arrest in return for a commitment to abandon the drug trade.74  A Chicago 
program has reportedly succeeded in reducing violence and recidivism by 
organizing discussion forums in which gun offenders on probation or parole 
meet with police officers, neighborhood residents, and social workers for 
discussions in which their concerns are treated with respect and their needs 
are addressed with support instead of only threats of punishment.75
 
71 See, e.g., MARTIN S. JANKOWSKI, ISLANDS IN THE STREET: GANGS AND AMERICAN 
URBAN SOCIETY 193–202 (1991); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of 
Life in Public Spaces, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 640–42 (1997). 
  
72 See supra text at notes 54, 56; Jeffrey Fagan & Tom R. Tyler, Legal Socialization of 
Children and Adolescents, 18 SOC. JUST. RES. 217 (2005); see also Tracey Meares, The 
Legitimacy of Police Among Young African-American Men, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 651 (2009).  
To be sure, further research is needed to clarify the links between adolescent experience and 
adult attitudes toward authority. 
73 See Anthony A. Braga, David M. Kennedy, Elin J. Waring & Anne Morrison Piehl, 
Problem-Oriented Policing, Deterrence, and Youth Violence: An Evaluation of Boston’s 
Operation Ceasefire, 38 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 195, 198, 220 (2000). 
74 See Mark Schoofs, New Intervention: Novel Police Tactic Puts Drug Markets out of 
Business, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2006, at A1.  
75 See Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares & Jeffrey Fagan, Attention Felons: 
Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 223, 254 
(2007). 
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Reportedly, as many as seventy-five cities are now implementing 
legitimacy-inspired initiatives of this kind.76
Although the value of such programs is now widely recognized, police 
departments have yet to fully appreciate their psychological basis and their 
relevance to the full range of policing activity.  Perhaps more worrisome is 
the fact that in many departments, officers have learned to acknowledge 
verbally the need to build community trust even when their behavior on the 
beat brazenly contradicts that commitment.  In a 2004 study, Gould and 
Mastrofski observed officers subjecting black suspects stopped on the street 
without justification to humiliating strip searches and rectal examination in 
public settings; back at the stationhouse, the same officers “expressed a 
desire to establish strong bonds with neighborhood residents and to treat all 
citizens, including suspects, with a respectful demeanor.”
 
77
Forcible street contacts will inevitably cause anxiety and discomfort 
for pedestrians and motorists who are stopped, and police departments must 
therefore remain sensitive to the need to control their frequency, especially 
when declining rates of success in the resulting searches and declining 
arrest rates (as a percentage of all stops) signal diminishing returns.  But 
forcible stops obviously should not be withdrawn from the law enforcement 
arsenal.  Stops based on objective indications of a serious offense are 
almost always warranted, and they need not trigger community mistrust if 
police pay attention to what happens during such stops.  Indeed, the 
available data suggest that although African Americans resent high levels of 
arrest for public-order offenses, their approval of the police is “positively 
correlated with arrest rates for more serious offenses.”
  Clearly, much 
more must be done to communicate convincingly to police officers the 
substance of that objective.  And equally important, officers must fully 
appreciate its rationale and empirical foundations, if they are to internalize 
the message. 
78
Thus, if stops are carefully initiated, police would not have to reduce 
their frequency.  But even then, the procedural justice approach emphasizes 
a need for change: police departments must focus on altering the dynamics 
of police–citizen interaction.  Instead of seeking to instill fear or project 
power, officers would aim to treat citizens courteously, briefly explain the 
reason for a stop, and, absent exigent circumstances, give the citizen an 
opportunity to explain herself before significant decisions are made.  
 
 
76 See Meares, supra note 72, at 665 & n.95; see also MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, WHEN 
BRUTE FORCE FAILS: HOW TO HAVE LESS CRIME AND LESS PUNISHMENT (2009) (discussing 
strategies to reduce crime with less reliance on arrest and incarceration). 
77 Jon B. Gould & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior 
Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 315, 345 (2004). 
78 Brooks, supra note 2, at 1225–26. 
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Moreover, they must be trained to maintain this orientation from the 
beginning of an encounter.  An officer who initiates a stop in an aggressive 
manner, assuming the worst, cannot easily pivot to a polite, diffident stance 
if his suspicions prove unfounded.  And even if he can do so, his 
explanations and apologies are unlikely to go far with an innocent citizen 
subjected to peremptory language and rough treatment at the outset. 
These elements of procedurally-fair interaction go well beyond 
constitutional minimums, which typically focus on limiting what the 
government can do.  But many requirements of constitutional law and 
criminal procedure do limit the way that government power is exercised.  
Even when officers have probable cause and a search warrant, the Fourth 
Amendment normally requires them to knock, announce their presence, 
state the basis of their authority, and give the homeowner an opportunity to 
admit them peaceably.79  Officers normally must give the homeowner a 
copy of the warrant, to provide official confirmation of their authority and 
the limits on the permitted scope of the search.80  After the search, they 
must deliver an inventory of items seized to establish a record of their 
actions and a readily understood basis for challenging unauthorized 
conduct.81  These requirements, so often celebrated in Fourth Amendment 
tradition,82 are not about limiting the tangible burdens government may 
impose; indeed the traditional abhorrence of clandestine searches83
 
79 See, e.g., Banks v. United States, 540 U.S. 31, 41 (2003) (discussing requirement of 
“reasonable wait time”); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997) (finding failure to 
knock and announce permissible only when officers have reasonable suspicion that doing so 
would be dangerous or futile); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995) (holding that 
common law “knock and announce” requirement forms part of the Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness inquiry). 
 is hard 
to understand from a purely material perspective.  The point of these 
requirements is essentially the same as that which the procedural justice 
findings stress—the importance of government’s perceived legitimacy, 
80 The obligation to provide a copy of the warrant is typically grounded in statutes or 
court rules but generally has not been treated as a Fourth Amendment requirement.  See 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.4, at 
177–78 (3d ed. 2000). 
81 City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234 (1999) (basing this requirement on 
Fourteenth Amendment due process rather than the Fourth Amendment). 
82 See, e.g., Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931–33 (tracing lineage of the knock-and-announce rule 
back to the thirteenth century and finding that it “was woven quickly into the fabric of early 
American law”). 
83 See, e.g., United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1336 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding 
clandestine search permissible only when secrecy is “essential”); United States v. Freitas, 
800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that when circumstances justify clandestine 
search, notice to homeowner must nonetheless be given within seven days; extensions of this 
period permissible only on a “strong showing of necessity”). 
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sustained by actions that build trust and treat citizens with respect.  The 
Miranda warnings were designed to serve the identical purpose, 
communicating to the suspect that officers will treat him with dignity and 
acknowledge his rights.84
There is no reason, however, for police conceptions of fair treatment to 
stop with the constitutional minimum.  In connection with street stops, 
operational guidelines within each department could formalize appropriate 
steps, such as the need for courteous treatment, the obligation to give the 
citizen a reason for the stop, and a chance to explain the circumstances.  In 
this spirit, the review committee established to examine the Gates incident 
in Cambridge cautioned that “actions that police take to protect their safety 
and the safety of others can seem cold, insensitive, or overly 
authoritarian . . . .  Whatever police can reasonably do to explain the 
reasons for the interaction and deescalate a situation is vital to the peaceful 
resolution of the encounter.”
 
85
As a simple way to put such priorities into practice, officers could 
easily carry and give to those they stop a card containing a short statement 
of the rules that govern police stops.  The card would enumerate the rights 
that must be respected (including the right to have the reasons for the stop 
explained and the right to tell their side of the story before decisions are 
made) and the procedures for complaining about unfair treatment.  Such 
efforts help communicate to the public that procedural justice principles are 
taken seriously. 
  Such steps could be made a routine part of 
every officer’s behavior on the beat.  With their low cost and potential for 
high crime-control payoff, changes like these are a smart use of limited 
police resources. 
Because trust in the police varies dramatically across racial lines,86
 
84 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457–60 (1966) (stating that in the absence of 
warnings, custodial interrogation “trades on the weaknesses of individuals” and is 
“destructive of human dignity”; “the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege 
[against self-incrimination] is the respect a government—state or federal—must accord to 
the dignity and integrity of its citizens.”). 
 
policing methods must be especially attuned to racial sensibilities.  Of 
course, that point in itself is not new.  But we can illustrate the need for a 
new emphasis by considering the issue of “profiling” and the Gates incident 
in particular.  Traditionally the study of racial profiling has focused upon 
whether reliance on racial markers actually occurs.  We might ask, for 
example, if Officer Crowley took into account Professor Gates’s African-
American appearance or whether the police generally profile minorities.  To 
do so we would collect statistics on street stops, adjust them for actual rates 
85 See CAMBRIDGE REVIEW COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 27. 
86 See supra text at note 2. 
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of offending in the target population, and analyze the data to determine if 
the police stop African Americans more often than is justified by 
objectively based concerns about crime. 
Following the argument of this Article, however, the Gates case (and 
other minority experiences with the police) would be approached from a 
different perspective.  People generally view racial profiling as unfair, and 
when police action leads people to feel they have been profiled, it prompts 
hostility.87  This response was evident when Professor Gates reacted to his 
perception that his treatment was explained simply by the fact that he was a 
“Black man in America.”88
This finding has two important implications.  First, a person can be 
strongly affected by police contact even if nothing legally significant 
happens.  Even when people are not arrested, they can still feel 
disrespected, and this will change their views about the police.  As a 
consequence, experiences need to be evaluated in terms of their influence 
upon the person’s views about the police, not just in terms of whether 
people were arrested and searched, or why (from the officer’s perspective) 
he decided to act.  Even trivial incivilities contribute to a climate of 
illegitimacy.  The Supreme Court, along with countless other observers, has 
repeatedly missed this point.
  The belief that the police are using unfair 
procedures delegitimates their authority and leads people to resist it. 
89
Second, people can have a positive experience even when the police 
take some potentially unwelcome enforcement action.  Police can therefore 
act to control crime and build legitimacy at the same time.  As shown in the 
research we have canvassed above, people who received a negative decision 
(such as a traffic ticket) from an officer who treated them fairly viewed the 




87 Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl Wakslak, Profiling and the Legitimacy of the Police: 
Procedural Justice, Attributions of Motive, and the Acceptance of Social Authority, 42 
CRIMINOLOGY 13, 13–42 (2004). 
  In short, 
police who treat people even-handedly and with respect can reinforce their 
legitimacy even when they are compelled by the situation to act firmly and 
aggressively—force is more acceptable when it is viewed as reasonable and 
88 See CAMBRIDGE REVIEW COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 56. 
89 See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (upholding authority of vice-
squad officers to make arrest for failure to signal a turn, whether or not their action was 
pretextual).  Compare United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560, 563 (1976) 
(holding “objective intrusion” was “minimal” because of stops’ “public and relatively 
routine nature,” even though stops were made “on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry”), 
with id. at 573 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (positing that the “experience [would be] particularly 
vexing for the motorist of Mexican ancestry who is selectively referred, knowing that the 
officers’ target is the Mexican alien”). 
90 See supra text at note 50. 
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justified and when it is delivered through just procedures.  These 
implications are relevant to much more than just race relations.  The 
research on legitimacy establishes that America’s policing model for 
dealing with people in all communities and of all ethnicities needs to 
change. 
Of course, there is a danger here.  Police who successfully cultivate a 
courteous, self-effacing demeanor could use that façade to mask 
discriminatory and unnecessarily intrusive practices.  We should perhaps be 
careful what we wish for.  But police are as yet light years away from 
acquiring the attitudes and behavior on patrol that could make this danger a 
reality.  The prospect of that unintended consequence simply underscores 
that a new emphasis on the neglected qualitative dimension of police–
citizen interaction must complement but not displace the equally important 
quantitative dimensions.  The frequency of stops, the success rates of 
associated searches, and the distribution of these outcomes across racial and 
ethnic groups are already important tools for gauging police performance.  
We claim that these metrics have too often monopolized attention, but an 
appreciation for the significance of perceived legitimacy would not by any 
means render these measures irrelevant or obsolete. 
B. POLICE MISCONDUCT 
Attention to legitimacy is important for another sort of compliance—
compliance by police officers themselves. 
Nearly all existing models of policing posit that an officer seeking to 
prevent crime and disorder wants to exert force (conducting stops, searches, 
and arrests) and that this desire is held in check by an unwelcome, 
externally imposed constraint—the obligation to remain within 
constitutional boundaries.  Professor Herbert Packer captured this notion 
and etched it into several generations of criminal procedure scholarship 
with his influential paradigm contrasting a “crime control model” (one that 
emphasizes the goal of reducing crime as efficiently as possible) with a 
“due process model” (one that gives priority to maintaining respect for 
individual rights).91
In this view, police who disregard search and seizure rules may face 
penalties (suppression of evidence, civil damages, or administrative 
sanctions), and such penalties are assumed to encourage compliance 
through the instrumental logic of deterrence.  The officer considers every 
stop and every search as potentially beneficial, but she must weigh those 
benefits against potential sanctions.  When the officer can foresee that an 
exclusionary rule applies, the expected costs will outweigh benefits, 
 
 
91 HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968). 
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misconduct will be deterred, and compliance with constitutional norms will 
be achieved.  Conversely, if an officer cannot foresee the prospect of an 
exclusionary sanction, her behavior supposedly cannot be affected.  For the 
current Supreme Court, this logic has become an analytic obsession, as a 
majority of the Justices now approach nearly every issue concerning the 
exclusionary rule by examining the details of presumed deterrence effects 
under particular circumstances.92
From a legitimacy perspective, inquiries of this sort (whatever their 
conclusions) are profoundly misguided.  The empirical research makes clear 
that fear of sanctions by itself generates only weak, poorly motivating 
incentives, which in turn produce at best a sullen, resentful, imperfect form 
of compliance.  And this is exactly what we often observe in the case of 
police officers asked to comply with the rules of search and seizure.  
Indeed, the payoff from instrumental deterrence in that context is especially 
poor, just as we would expect, because those rules and their accompanying 
sanctions enjoy little legitimacy in the eyes of the police to whom they are 
addressed.  Like the exclusionary rule and for similar reasons, damage suits 
and institutional reform litigation have had only mixed success in changing 
the culture of police organizations.
 
93
The legitimacy perspective makes clear that seeking to compel change 
through suppression remedies, lawsuits, and consent decrees can have only 
limited effectiveness because the police then seek ways to avoid detection 
and accountability.  Just as with achieving compliance by the public, so 
with the police: we need to change what they want to do. 
 
The difference between Fourth and Fifth Amendment requirements is 
telling here.  Police compliance with the rules of search and seizure is 
always in doubt; evasion and even outright perjury are sometimes the 
officer’s preferred course.94
 
92 See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009) (exclusionary rule 
applies only when exclusion can “meaningfully deter” police misconduct); Hudson v. 
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596–97 (2006) (same); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 
(1984) (same).  But see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (exclusionary rule may not be 
invoked to suppress fruits of an illegal search that did not violate the defendant’s personal 
rights). 
  In contrast, police interrogators for the most 
part follow Miranda and give the warnings routinely.  The reason is simple: 
93 See Barbara Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 453, 464–78 (2004) (cataloguing reasons why individual remedies are 
ineffective at changing police institutions); David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the 
Violence be Contained?, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 480–88 (1992) (discussing lack of 
success in judicial efforts to change police culture). 
94 See, e.g., Myron W. Orfield, Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An 
Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 82–83 (1992) 
(documenting pervasive police perjury used to avoid exclusionary rule in important cases). 
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police have learned that they benefit from compliance, because the Miranda 
warnings tend to put suspects at ease by creating a (false) sense of security 
and thereby help officers to get confessions.95
The procedural justice model is promising from this perspective both 




 We do not doubt the importance of penalties such as the exclusionary 
rule and will have more to say about them in a moment.  But reform of 
police organizations must start from within.  Articles that make a seemingly 
similar point—for example, urging reliance on internal police guidelines, 
civilian review boards, and administrative sanctions—are too numerous to 
count, but nearly all proposals of this sort lack an essential feature: positive 
motivation.  The empirical findings make clear that police must want to 
follow such guidelines, because (as in the case of citizens who might 
contemplate other sorts of wrongdoing) the probability that a violation will 
be detected and punished often is too low to provide in itself a sufficiently 
strong reason for obedience.  
 are simple to implement and relatively inexpensive.  More 
important, they benefit the police themselves, not just outside citizens and 
“bad guys.”  By projecting sensitivity to procedural justice, officers build 
their legitimacy and nurture public support.  They thereby gain community 
respect, enhance the safety of their working environment, and create 
conditions likely to elicit greater cooperation in fighting crime.  The police 
are gradually transformed from an occupying force into genuine partners 
with all components of the community, minorities and the poor included.  
And, of course, such changes also benefit the community, in particular 
minorities and the poor, who are policed in a more professional and 
respectful manner. 
 Creating positive motivations for compliance is essential not only to 
ensure respect for citizens’ rights but also to achieve adherence to a broad 
range of internal operational standards and norms.  A working environment 
conducive to those motivations involves several elements.  The 
management literature develops them in detail,97
 
95 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and 
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 516–38 (1996) (reviewing evidence 
to this effect). 
 and we do not propose to 
discuss them in depth here.  But the key ingredient is worth emphasizing, 
though it is obvious from what we have already said, because the criminal 
procedure and organizational-reform literature almost always assumes that 
ingredient to be missing and unattainable.  The ingredient, of course, is the 
96 See supra text at notes 73–90. 
97 See, e.g., V. Lee Hamilton & Joseph Sanders, Responsibility and Risk in 
Organizational Crimes of Obedience, 14 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 49 (1992). 
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legitimacy of the rules in question.  And by legitimacy here, we do not 
mean a legal or constitutional legitimacy grounded in a duly enacted text.  
Rather, as we have stressed throughout, the key concept is social and 
psychological legitimacy, from the perspective of the target audience whose 
compliance is sought.  Officers must come to understand that observing the 
tenets of procedural justice will serve their own interest, apart from the 
constitutional pedigree of these norms, even when (as with many of the fair-
treatment dimensions of procedural justice) the norms are by no means 
constitutionally mandated. 
1. Tone from the Top  
Attaining this sort of legitimacy begins with the “tone from the top.”  
Police leaders must emphasize the value of building public support, helping 
citizens to feel comfortable and safe rather than threatened by the police 
presence.  Leaders must communicate that while force will always have a 
role in policing, that role should be as a last resort, one that should seldom 
need to be used. 
2. Recognition and Reward 
Police reward structures also need to be reshaped so that building 
legitimacy in the community is viewed as a goal of equal importance to 
issuing traffic tickets and making arrests.  If officers believe that their 
advancement, compensation, and respect in the eyes of their leadership are 
linked to their ability to create legitimacy and motivate cooperation, they 
are more likely to follow the principles of procedural fairness in their 
behavior on the street. 
When considering incentive structures, it is important to think beyond 
material rewards.  Studies of work organizations suggest that the impact of 
material rewards generally flows through their role in signaling 
management respect for employees and their contributions.  Employees 
want to know that their efforts are valued by their superiors.98
 
98 See Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. Blader, Can Businesses Effectively Regulate Employee 
Conduct? The Antecedents of Rule Following in Work Settings, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1143, 
1153 (2005). 
  Studies of 
police organizations indicate that one of the best ways to communicate 
respect is to follow the principles of procedural justice (fair decisionmaking 
and fair interpersonal treatment) in dealing with officers themselves.  
Officers in the ranks should be afforded a voice in the formulation of the 
rules that govern their performance (a step to which police departments 
have recently become more receptive), and they must feel fairly treated in 
connection with internal discipline and civilian review board procedures.  
360 SCHULHOFER, TYLER & HUQ [Vol. 101 
Officers who feel respected are more likely to accept departmental policies 
as legitimate and to comply with them voluntarily.99
Correspondingly, officers need to believe that their adherence to these 
policies will be recognized by their superiors.  Being able to reward the 
police in this way requires new sorts of data.  Routine efforts to follow up 
on police–citizen contact can verify compliance with procedural justice 
principles and reinforce a procedural justice culture within the police 
department.  Police statisticians must move beyond their preoccupation 
with clearance rates to measure trends in public confidence in the police and 
in public evaluations of the fairness of police practices, both among those 
who have had personal experiences with the police and in the community 
generally.  In London, for example, the Metropolitan Police now routinely 
surveys the public to ascertain levels of public confidence in law 
enforcement and willingness to cooperate.
 
100
A similar linkage between public perceptions and police attitudes in 
matters of procedural justice could profitably be examined in connection 
with civilian review boards or purely internal disciplinary processes.  We 
need to pay more attention to the ways in which these review mechanisms 
are seen in the eyes of both citizens and the cops who are potentially subject 
to them.  And in line with the theme of nurturing legitimacy by rewards as 
well as sanctions, civilian review boards could well make it part of their 
mission to look for successes as well as the most egregious failures, and to 
ensure that successes are appropriately recognized. 
  Such data collection efforts 
nurture the legitimacy of procedural justice norms in the eyes of the cop on 
the beat while also signaling to the public that support for these norms is 
genuine within the police department itself. 
3. The Exclusionary Rule 
If the perceived legitimacy of the rules governing police behavior is 
the key to compliance, and if instrumental incentives have little bite, can we 
dispense with sanctions like the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule?  The 
question is by no means merely academic.  A chorus of voices has argued 
that changes in urban politics and in the demography and professionalism of 
the police have made obsolete the judicially enforced criminal procedure 
restraints developed by the Warren and Burger Courts in response to police 
 
99 Tom R. Tyler, Patrick E. Callahan & Jeffrey Frost, Armed, and Dangerous (?): 
Motivating Rule Adherence Among Agents of Social Control, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457, 
481, 483 (2007). 
100 For details on the methodology and results of the most recent survey, see 
Metropolitan Police Service (London), Public Confidence in Policing London, 
http://www.met.police.uk/about/performance/confidence.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).  
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oppression of minorities.101  And the Supreme Court itself seems 
increasingly ready to gut the exclusionary rule or abandon it completely.102  
There is much to be said on the other side of this debate,103
From its inception, the exclusionary rule has reflected two distinct, 
though complementary concerns.  One is the desire “to deter—to compel 
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available 
way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.”
 but here we 
focus solely on the research findings concerning procedural justice and 
legitimacy. 
104  But in adopting the 
exclusionary rule in Mapp v. Ohio, the Court also stressed that “there is 
another consideration—the imperative of judicial integrity.”105
For both Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis, “judicial integrity” was 
the decisive point.  As Justice Brandeis put it, exclusion of tainted evidence 





101 See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006) (stating that “[a]nother 
development over the past half-century that deters civil-rights violations [thus making the 
exclusionary rule less necessary] is the increasing professionalism of police forces, including 
a new emphasis on internal police discipline”); Kahan & Meares, supra note 
  The objective, he said in one of his best 
53, at 1169–70 
(stating that in “today’s inner city . . . the citizens who support giving more discretion to the 
police are the same ones who are exposed to the risk that discretion will be abused”). 
102 See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009) (rejecting the rule that 
suppression is presumptively mandated for all illegally seized evidence and holding that 
“police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and 
sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system”); 
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591, 597, 599 (stating that the exclusionary rule should be applied only 
where deterrence benefits outweigh its “massive” social costs, and, because “much has 
changed” since 1961, exclusion is not necessarily justified today simply because that remedy 
was held necessary “in different contexts and long ago”). 
103 The Fourth Amendment at its inception had nothing whatever to do with preventing 
racial oppression, and to the extent that this concern has greater salience today, it is not 
plausible to suggest that American policing tactics have rendered it obsolete.  In any event, 
there is no evidence to support (and much evidence to contradict) the Court’s assumption in 
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597–98, that civil damage liability provides all the deterrence needed.  
See id., at 609–11 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that any damages awarded are likely to be 
nominal); Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 709 n.6 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[P]rofessionalism is a 
sign of the exclusionary rule’s efficacy—not of its superfluity”); David Alan Sklansky, Is the 
Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567, 579–82 (2008) (“Despite the 
genuinely vast changes in law enforcement over the past forty years, the exclusionary rule 
probably still does a lot of work that no other remedy stands ready to duplicate.”). 
104 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 
206, 217 (1960)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
105 Id. at 659 (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
106 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see 
also id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[I]t [is] a less evil that some criminals should 
escape than that the Government should play an ignoble part.”). 
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known opinions, is not to tip the balance of an individual officer’s 
incentives but to protect the foundations of government itself: “Our 
Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.  For good or ill, it 
teaches the whole people by its example . . . .  If the Government becomes a 
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; . . . it invites anarchy.”107  Justice 
Brennan urged the same view, emphasizing that suppression of tainted 
evidence “assur[es] the people . . . that the government would not profit 
from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously 
undermining popular trust in government.”108
In its latest opinions, the Court acknowledged that this perspective 
dominated at the outset, but declared that “we have long since rejected that 
approach.”
 
109  Instead, the Court now insists that exclusion is justified 
solely by potential deterrence of police misconduct, and it gives that 
rationale a newly constrained form.  Two conditions must be met: there 
must be “appreciable” deterrence and, in addition, “[t]o the extent that 
application of the exclusionary rule could provide some incremental 
deterrent, that possible benefit must be weighed against [its] substantial 
social costs.”110  As a result, exclusion now is “our last resort, not our first 
impulse.”111  And raising even further this barrier to a suppression remedy, 
the Court seems to have set aside the long-standing rule of exclusion for the 
fruits of objectively unreasonable police searches and arrests.  Instead, “[t]o 
trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate 
that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such 
deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.”112
The present Court’s assumption that suppression inflicts substantial 
costs, by weakening our ability to impose criminal punishment, is of course 
the polar opposite of the Brandeis view that it is the failure to suppress that 
will breed lawlessness.  As an a priori matter, neither view is intrinsically 
implausible.  But the empirical research canvassed here has direct relevance 
for this debate.  And those studies provide compelling support for the 
Brandeis insight on which the exclusionary rule originally rested.  Indeed, 
  This new 
approach gives the police, and is expressly designed to give the police, 
much greater freedom to secure convictions by using illegally seized 
evidence. 
 
107 Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
108 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
109 Hudson, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (acknowledging that “[e]xpansive dicta in 
Mapp . . . suggested wide scope for the exclusionary rule”). 
110 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700–01 (2009) (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480 
U.S. 340, 352–53 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
111 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591. 
112 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702. 
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Justice Brandeis’s reasoning presciently expresses the best current 
understanding of the connections between legitimacy, procedural justice, 
and the control of crime. 
As we have developed in detail throughout this Article, the research 
regularly finds that people comply with the law not primarily because of 
fear of sanctions but rather because they believe that authorities that have 
legitimacy should be obeyed.  And such legitimacy flows from people’s 
confidence that officials are trustworthy, that they abide by the law, and that 
they treat citizens with respect.113
Opponents of the exclusionary rule sometimes suggest that the notion 
of “judicial integrity” argues against suppression of illegally seized 
evidence.  Contrary to Justice Brandeis, they insist that because suppression 
can allow obviously guilty defendants to go free, it undermines public 
confidence in the criminal justice system.
  Official disregard for the law—made 
evident when misconduct can be openly exploited to prosecutorial 
advantage in court—is the kind of behavior that, the research establishes, 
tends to weaken perceived legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with law 
enforcement. 
114  The legitimacy research has 
not tested this sort of claim in the specific context of the exclusionary rule.  
But the general question this argument poses—whether legitimacy is 
shaped more strongly by police effectiveness than by procedural justice—
has been studied in depth across a wide variety of law enforcement 
situations.115  And the findings are consistent: in virtually every context 
studied to date, law enforcement effectiveness has displayed at best only a 
weak influence on perceived legitimacy, while procedural justice concerns 
are strongly linked to legitimacy, voluntary compliance, and willingness to 
cooperate.116
Against this background, relaxation of the exclusionary rule represents 
a direct assault on the capacity of our law enforcement system to succeed in 
its mission of maintaining social order.  To be sure, a prosecutor’s ability to 
use illegally seized evidence increases her capacity to secure a conviction 
and a long sentence, an unequivocal crime control benefit if viewed strictly 
 
 
113 See supra text at notes 50–55. 
114 See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? 
Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2513 (1996) (describing this 
argument and its role in the development of the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule). 
115 See, e.g., TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 46; Tyler & Fagan, supra note 47; 
Tyler, Schulhofer & Huq, supra note 58. 
116 See, e.g., TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 46, at 59 (linking procedural justice 
concerns to compliance); Tyler & Fagan, supra note 47, at 251 tbl.3 (linking procedural 
justice concerns to cooperation); Tyler, Schulhofer & Huq, supra note 58, at 380 (linking 
procedural justice concerns to cooperation). 
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in the short term.  But the strong and consistent finding of the relevant 
research is that the net effect of law enforcement disregard for the law is 
likely to be the opposite, because judicial tolerance for Fourth Amendment 
violations will generate disrespect for authority, chill voluntary compliance, 
and discourage law-abiding citizens from offering the cooperation that 
makes it possible to apprehend and convict other offenders in future 
cases.117
Controlling ordinary crime and controlling police misconduct thus are 
closely connected.  And if we are to succeed at both, procedural justice 
concerns must be placed at the center of attention. 
 
C. DOMESTIC COUNTERTERRORISM 
Terrorism is generally considered a problem to be distinguished from 
ordinary wrongdoing.  Like efforts to combat drug trafficking and some 
forms of organized crime, preventing terrorist attacks requires close 
attention to international linkages, and federal enforcement agencies take 
the lead.  Yet terrorism differs significantly from other sorts of transnational 
criminality.  Its motivations are usually political rather than financial, its 
potential for social harm is vastly greater, and its connections to foreign 
policy and armed conflict are more prominent.  Partly for those reasons, the 
structure of law enforcement is distinctive.  Local policing is sometimes 
relegated to an afterthought; the federal government is expected to play, and 
does play, an overwhelmingly dominant role.118
In light of these contrasts, the applicability of the procedural justice 
approach to counterterrorism can hardly be taken for granted.  Yet criminal 
justice theory and the dynamics of terrorism both suggest that this model 
has powerful relevance.  And as we discuss below, the empirical research 
specific to this context, though less comprehensive than that in the area of 
ordinary crime, confirms its importance at all levels, from grand strategy in 
the federal agencies to the daily behavior of the cop on the beat. 
 
 
117 See, e.g., Lyons, supra note 39, at 538 (finding that desired cooperation occurs only 
when police build community “understanding, trust and respect”); Tyler, Legitimacy, supra 
note 49, at 379–80 (police effectiveness is much less important than perceived legitimacy in 
predicting willingness to cooperate); Tyler, Schulhofer & Huq, supra note 58, at 380 tbl.1 
(finding perceived effectiveness of police has no significant correlation with willingness to 
cooperate, but that procedural justice concerns are strongly correlated with willingness to 
cooperate). 
118 See, e.g., David Thacher, The Local Role in Homeland Security, 39 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 635, 669 (2005) (describing factors that prompt federal institutions to take lead); Dafna 
Linzer, In New York, a Turf War in the Battle Against Terrorism, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 
2008, at A1 (describing FBI reluctance to cede responsibilities to New York City Police 
Department).  But see Samuel J. Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown (Counter)Terrorism, 88 
TEX. L. REV. 1715 (2010) (arguing that local police must play significant role). 
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Start at the place that usually gets the least attention—local policing.  
Despite the widespread assumption of federal primacy, law enforcement 
officials increasingly recognize that local police must play a significant 
role.  Collaboration has even been channeled through formal institutions 
such as Joint Terrorism Task Forces and “fusion centers.”119
In part, the growing involvement of local police flows from perceived 
changes to the nature of the terrorist challenge.  In the aftermath of the 
September 2001 attacks, the threat was perceived as a largely foreign-
source affair.  The July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate played down 
terrorist threats of domestic origin and identified the growing strength of al 
Qaeda in western Pakistan as the principal danger to the United States.
 
120  
In late 2009, this perception began to change with a series of allegations 
concerning terrorism conspiracies developed within the United States.121  
The 2010 National Security Strategy warned that “recent incidences of 
violent extremists in the United States” demonstrate “the threat to the 
United States and our interests posed by individuals radicalized at home.”122  
Of 202 people charged with serious terrorist crimes since September 11, 
2001, more than half have been U.S. citizens, and over one-third of those 
have been American-born.123
These new threats give local law enforcement increased prominence, 
but its importance is now acknowledged even in connection with dangers 
emanating abroad.  A recent RAND Corporation report, drawing from 
global counterterrorism experiences, notes that terrorism is largely a 
policing problem, not a military matter, because local police are best able to 
 
 
119 See JOHN ROLLINS, CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERV., NO. RL34070, FUSION CENTERS: 
ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 1–2 (updated Jan. 18, 2008), available at http://fas.org/
sgp/crs/intel/RL34070.pdf. 
120 NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE: THE TERRORIST 
THREAT TO THE US HOMELAND 5 (2007).  The National Intelligence Estimate summarizes 
“the Intelligence Community’s (IC) most authoritative written judgments on national 
security issues . . . .”  Id. at 2. 
121 These conspiracies included the decision of a Somali-American to travel to Somalia 
and become the first American suicide bomber, the July 2009 arrest of seven North Carolina 
Muslims on allegations they intended to commit suicide attacks, the September 2009 arrest 
of Afghan-born Najibullah Zazi based on allegations that he intended to attack the New York 
subway system, the October 2009 arrest of Pakistani-American David Headley in connection 
with the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and the May 2010 attempt by Pakistani-born American 
citizen Faisal Shahzad to explode a car bomb in New York’s Times Square.  See JEROME P. 
BJELOPERA & MARK A. RANDOL, CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERV., AMERICAN JIHADIST 
TERRORISM: COMBATING A COMPLEX THREAT 74–76, 79, 81–82, 86–91 (2010), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf; Karen J. Greenberg, Homegrown: The Rise of 
American Jihad, NEW REPUBLIC, June 10, 2010, at 6, 7. 
122 PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 19 (May 2010). 
123 Greenberg, supra note 121, at 6–7. 
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build relationships with the communities in which terrorists try to hide and 
recruit members.  The report urges police to “actively encourage and 
cultivate cooperation by building stronger ties with community 
leaders . . . .”124  Another RAND report observes that “state and local law 
enforcement agencies . . . may be uniquely positioned to augment federal 
intelligence capabilities by virtue of their presence in nearly every 
American community [and] their knowledge of local individuals and 
groups . . . .”125  These conclusions are consonant with a broader stream of 
thought that understands global terrorism as a form of “insurgency” most 
easily defeated by winning the loyalty of the communities in which 
terrorists may be found.126  Even in foreign theaters of military operation, 
heavy firepower, though still favored by some,127 is increasingly de-
emphasized in favor of at least partial reliance upon measures akin to 
domestic policing.128
Local police thus play a crucial role by virtue of their familiarity with 
neighborhoods and their ability to elicit information held within domestic 
communities.  And with counterterrorism as with policing against 
conventional crime, community cooperation is essential if the police are to 
perform this role successfully.  Moreover, as with traditional policing, 
cooperation cannot be taken for granted.  Indeed, cooperation may be even 
more fragile in the context of counterterrorism than in ordinary law 
enforcement: Law-abiding members of the relevant community, though 
unswervingly loyal to the United States, know that cooperation could mean 
exposing people with whom they share close ethnic and religious ties to 
unusually harsh procedures and sanctions.  Shaping sound policy to 
navigate these sensibilities is thus vitally important but exceptionally 
delicate. 
 
Law enforcement agencies, however, do not follow a unified approach.  
The decision to opt for policing rather than a military model leaves open 
 
124 SETH G. JONES & MARTIN C. LIBICKI, HOW TERRORIST GROUPS END: LESSONS FOR 
COUNTERING AL QA’IDA 27 (2008). 
125 K. JACK RILEY ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM ix 
(2005); accord Gary LaFree & James Hendrickson, Build a Criminal Justice Policy for 
Terrorism, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 781, 783 (2007) (“In many ways the community-
oriented approach favored by successful police departments is the same kind of approach 
that is most likely to uncover terrorist operations.”). 
126 See, e.g., DAVID KILCULLEN, COUNTERINSURGENCY 3–5 (2010). 
127 See supra text at notes 28–29 (discussing commentators who urge the U.S. to make 
greater use of air power against the Taliban, even at the risk of extensive civilian casualties). 
128 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL NO. 3-24, MARINE 
CORPS WARFIGHTING PUBLICATION NO. 3-33.5, COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL xxv 
(2007) (noting that “the civilian population [is] . . . the deciding factor in the struggle,” with 
the key issue being the ability to secure their support). 
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important choices.  One is whether to focus on intrusive enforcement and 
intelligence-gathering methods that promise instrumental gains (at possible 
cost to perceived legitimacy), or whether instead to emphasize long-term 
efforts to build community trust.  Second, where priority is given to the 
objectives of trust and cooperation, should those goals be pursued primarily 
by a “top down” approach (building ties to community leaders, as 
recommended in the RAND report129
In Dearborn, Michigan, which has an Arab-American community of 
200,000, law enforcement has made the maintenance of good police–
community relations a “major concern.”
), or should officials emphasize a 
“bottom up” policy stressing the quality of interaction with individuals in 
ordinary street-level encounters? 
130  In other cities, relations 
between Muslim-American communities and local police departments are 
strained.131  At the federal level, community outreach has not been 
ignored,132 but policy has been dominated by measures that relax procedural 
restraints on investigation and detention while expanding substantive 
criminal offenses to reach behavior with only tenuous connections to acts of 
violence.133  From the general public to many of our highest officials, it is 
often considered self-evident that tougher measures will pay greater 
dividends.134  In Britain, in contrast, those who lead the counterterrorism 
effort often stress that success depends on building community trust by 
adhering to traditional conceptions of due process.135
 
129 See JONES & LIBICKI, supra note 
  In short, no unified 
124, at 27. 
130 Thacher, supra note 118, at 649. 
131 See, e.g., Richard Winton & Teresa Watanabe, LAPD’s Muslim Mapping Plan Killed, 
L.A. TIMES, Nov, 15, 2007, at A1 (describing controversy over a police department effort to 
address “radicalization” with aid of a “community mapping” plan to identify geographic 
locations of Muslim populations). 
132 See Andrea Elliott, White House Quietly Courts Muslims in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 18, 2010, at A1. 
133 Prominent examples include expansion of search and surveillance powers, military 
detention of alleged “enemy combatants,” aggressive use of immigration detention and 
deportation, and enactment of broader definitions of prohibited “material support” for 
terrorism.  See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (upholding 
the constitutionality of a prohibition on giving “material support” by acts intended to support 
humanitarian and political activities).  See generally STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, THE ENEMY 
WITHIN (2002) (cataloguing post-9/11 measures that expand intelligence gathering and law 
enforcement powers). 
134 See, e.g., Harris, Allen & VandeHei, supra note 31 (quoting former Vice President 
Dick Cheney, stating that counterterrorism is “a tough, mean, dirty, nasty business . . . .  
[W]e’re not going to win this fight by turning the other cheek . . . .  The United States needs 
to be not so much loved as it needs to be respected.  Sometimes, that requires us to take 
actions that generate controversy”). 
135 See, e.g., Peter Clarke, The Courts and Terrorism: Transatlantic Observations, Lecture 
at NYU Law School 2–3 (Apr. 15, 2009) (on file with the authors) (stating, as former chief 
368 SCHULHOFER, TYLER & HUQ [Vol. 101 
approach to counterterrorism policing has emerged.  Instead, officials 
commonly emphasize intrusive or coercive tactics without examining their 
collateral costs, or focus on generating cooperative relationships with 
Muslim community leaders while neglecting the character of daily 
interactions at the grassroots.  A central concern is the need to determine 
which approaches yield the best results in terms of security. 
The available empirical evidence offers stark warnings about the 
potentially counterproductive effects of harsh measures.  A study of British 
counterterrorism policies in Northern Ireland found that of six high-
visibility crackdown initiatives, only one had an observable deterrent 
effect.136  Two others had no statistically significant impact, while two 
intrusive policies were associated with significant increases in violence.137  
The researchers hypothesized that erroneous arrests and the adoption of 
internment without trial contributed to this backlash by undermining the 
legitimacy of anti-terrorism efforts.138
 
of counterterrorism in London’s Metropolitan Police, that “[for] deeply pragmatic 
reasons, . . . it is absolutely essential to adhere to due process . . . .  People . . . must have 
confidence and trust in the authorities . . . .  They must believe . . . that information . . . will 
not be used . . . to stigmatize their communities or to justify extrajudicial action”).  For an 
assessment suggesting mixed results from British efforts to build community trust through its 
“Prevent” program, see HOUSE OF COMMONS, CMTYS. & LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE, 
PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM 3–4 (Mar. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcomloc/65/65.pdf; Vikram 
Dodd, Communities Fear Project Is Not What It Seems, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct 17, 2010, 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2009/oct/16/prevent-counter-islamic 
-extremism-intelligence.  
  Similarly, studies have found that 
 Responding to such concerns (among others), the British government has proposed to roll 
back many powers granted since September 11, 2001; the authority to detain terrorism 
suspects for up to twenty-eight days prior to charge would be reduced to fourteen days. 
Protection of Freedoms Bill, 2011, H.C. Bill [146] cl. 57, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2010-2011/0146/2011146.pdf. The 
proposal regarding pre-charge detention reflects concerns that the extended power is 
unnecessary and “has a negative impact on Muslim communities.” HM GOVERNMENT, 
REVIEW OF COUNTER-TERRORISM AND SECURITY POWERS: REVIEW FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (2011), available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/
counter-terrorism/review-of-ct-security-powers/review-findings-and-rec?view=Binary. 
136 Gary LaFree, Laura Dugan & Raven Korte, The Impact of British Counterterrorist 
Strategies on Political Violence in Northern Ireland: Comparing Deterrence and Backlash 
Models, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 17, 25–27, 34 (2009). 
137 Id. at 32–34.  The sixth intervention studied by LaFree, et al. involved a shift from 
military methods to locally administered criminal justice procedures, treating captured 
terrorists as ordinary criminal suspects in an effort to delegitimate their cause.  The detainees 
responded with a hunger strike to obtain a return to “prisoner-of-war” status.  Further anti-
British animosity resulted, and violence subsequently increased.  Id. at 36.  That finding 
underscores the point that both deterrence and backlash effects can be highly sensitive to 
context. 
138 Id. at 33–34. 
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perceived injustice on the part of U.S. forces in Iraq is a strong predictor of 
support for resistance there.139
Turning to counterterrorism tactics in the American domestic context, 
many thoughtful scholars have suggested that the heightened threat 
environment post-9/11 may justify wider use of ethnic profiling
 
140 and other 
enhanced police powers, such as greater ability to establish roadblocks and 
checkpoints.141  Yet we have already noted the potential negative impact of 
such policing activities; in the context of ordinary law enforcement, zero-
tolerance measures have often backfired, encouraging crime and 
discouraging cooperation by creating resentment in minority 
communities.142
That said, we cannot assume that findings from ordinary law 
enforcement will apply in a straightforward way to counterterrorism 
policing.  Because terrorism is motivated by ideology rather than desire for 
material gain, co-religionists or members of the same ethnic community 
may share some ideological perspectives with those who plan acts of terror.  
As a result, law-abiding individuals may be reluctant to put politically 
radical members of their communities at risk, even when they themselves 
oppose violence.  In addition, because al Qaeda invokes religious 
justifications for its goals and methods, the religiosity of law-abiding 
Muslims could conceivably alter the importance of procedural justice for 
securing their cooperation.  Finally, because links between procedural 
justice and willingness to comply or cooperate have not been found in all 
  A similar problem could well defeat efforts to augment 
counterterrorism powers.  Indeed, because terrorism is a relatively dispersed 
and infrequent phenomenon, posing a threat to a near-infinite range of 
symbolic targets and typically using operatives with no prior record of 
terrorist activity, accurate and timely information to separate genuine 
threats from background noise has enormous value.  Community 
cooperation therefore assumes even greater than usual importance.  To the 
extent that terrorist groups seek either to recruit or hide within co-religionist 
communities, cooperation can provide information at lower cost and with 
fewer negative side effects than coercive or intrusive forms of intelligence 
gathering. 
 
139 See, e.g., Ronald Fischer, et al., Support for Resistance Among Iraqi Students, 30 
BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 167, 173 (2008). 
140 See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1436–38 (2002) (approving such measures in some circumstances, 
though urging cautious implementation). 
141 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 
2141–42 (2002). 
142 See supra text at notes 54, 61–62. 
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societies,143
To test the links between legitimacy, procedural fairness, and 
cooperation in communities impacted by counterterrorism enforcement, we 
conducted extensive interviews and random polling of Muslim-American 
residents of New York City.
 recent Muslim immigrants who have lived under repressive 
governments could conceivably have different notions of legitimacy or its 
importance for cooperation. 
144  We found little evidence that religiosity, 
cultural differences, or political background play a significant role in 
determining willingness to cooperate.  The same is true for strength of 
identification with the Muslim community; disagreement with American 
government policies on Iraq, Afghanistan, and Israel; and instrumental 
concerns such as a belief that the police are effective.145  In contrast, as in 
the case of conventional law enforcement, we found a strong association 
between willingness to cooperate with anti-terrorism policing and 
perceptions of procedural justice. 146
One way to test the force of these relationships is to look separately at 
groups that have particular views about law enforcement or terrorism.  For 
example, people who consider the terror threat very serious presumably will 
be much more willing to cooperate and their willingness might not be 
affected so much by whether they think police actions are intrusive or 
procedurally irregular.  Likewise, people who consider the police effective 
and people who are inclined to defer to authority presumably will be willing 
to cooperate and again their willingness might not be affected so much by 
whether they think police practices are fair. 
 
To look at those possibilities, we divided our sample into people who 
think that the terror threat is serious (or not), people who think the police 
are effective (or not), and likewise for the other pairs of attitudes.  Table 1 
below, drawn from the New York City data, shows these relationships. 
Part of what Table 1 shows is not surprising.  Among people who 
think the terror threat is not serious, willingness to cooperate is reduced 
substantially by perceptions that the police use intrusive tactics, target 
minorities, or act unfairly.  We see roughly the same effect for the negative 
alternative in the case of each of the other prior attitudes as well.  In other 
words, among people who can be considered law enforcement skeptics 
 
 
143 See, e.g., Joel Brockner et al., Culture and Procedural Justice: The Influence of 
Power Distance on Reactions to Voice, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 300, 314 (2001) 
(finding that, in China, people do not react as strongly as in other cultures to procedural 
unfairness). 
144 See Tyler, Schulhofer & Huq, supra note 58.  
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
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Table 1 
Relationships Within Prior-Attitude Subgroups:  
Police Behavior and Perceived Procedural Justice as  








of the Police 
Terror Is Serious 
No -.26*** -.21*** .37*** 
Yes -.08*** -.23*** .40*** 
Police Are Effective 
No -.18*** -.12*** .41*** 
Yes -.02*** -.11*** .26*** 
Police Help You Feel Safe 
No -.19*** -.13*** .36*** 
Yes -.07*** -.10*** .49*** 
Preference for Law Enforcement Authority 
No -.20*** -.20*** .41*** 
Yes -.09*** -.10*** .29*** 
Respect for Hierarchy 
Low -.27*** -.20*** .40*** 
High -.13*** -.11*** .33*** 
* = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
 
(Entries are subgroup correlations with a combined  
measure of legitimacy and cooperation.) 
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(people who prefer liberty to order, reject hierarchies, and think the police 
are not effective), cooperation drops substantially when police are perceived 
as intrusive or unfair.  These are largely the results we would expect, but 
they underscore the importance of fairness for cooperation among a 
substantial segment of the population. 
When we look at the lower row of each pair, those who think terrorism 
is a serious problem and generally favor law enforcement authority, we see 
in column 1 that cooperation is not affected by the use of intrusive tactics.  
These people seem more focused on instrumental payoffs than on 
legitimacy.  They are generally willing to accept intrusive tactics when they 
accept hierarchical authority and consider the police effective. 
But two relationships are less predictable.  First, even when these 
respondents consider the terror threat very serious, cooperation drops 
substantially if they believe the police are targeting people in their 
community.  And second, in the lower row of all of these pairs (i.e., among 
those who broadly support law enforcement), column 3 shows that 
cooperation drops substantially, with very high statistical significance, 
when police use unfair procedures, such as stopping people without 
explanation, denying them any opportunity to be heard, and failing to treat 
them with courtesy.  In other words, for all of these subgroups, regardless 
of prior attitudes about the police, civil liberties, and so on, perceptions of 
procedural justice have a major impact on willingness to cooperate. 
We can illustrate the concrete impact of these relationships by 
separating the respondents into quartiles based on the extent to which they 
saw the police as respecting (or not respecting) the requirements of 
procedural justice.  We can then focus on willingness to cooperate within 
each group.  By highlighting the differences between the groups, Tables 2 
and 3 illustrate the consequences of failing to nurture perceptions of 
procedural fairness. 
These tables show in more tangible terms the impact of procedural 
justice on cooperation.  Table 2 focuses on perceived fairness in 
establishing counterterrorism policies.  When people believe that overall 
policies are established fairly, willingness to work with the police rises by 
11%, and even more strikingly, willingness to report suspicious activity 
rises by 61%.  That 61% figure is an increase of enormous significance for 
successful intelligence gathering: Fairness in establishing policies makes it 
61% more likely that people in this community will be willing to report 
suspicious behavior. 
Table 3 shifts the focus to perceived fairness in enforcement.  When 
people believe that policies are fairly implemented, willingness to report 
suspicious activity increases by 41% and willingness to work with the 
police increases by 62%. 
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Table 2 
Willingness to Cooperate Among Muslim-Americans 
Belief That Policy is 
Created Fairly 
   Percent of Each Quartile Willing to: 
 n Work With Police    Alert Police 
Very Low 71         82%          49% 
Medium Low 69         78%          66% 
Medium High 83         88%          67% 
Very High 68         91%          79% 
Difference          +9 pts (+ 11%)        +30 pts (+61%) 




Willingness to Cooperate Among Muslim-Americans 
Belief That Policy is 
Enforced Fairly 
   Percent of Each Quartile Willing to: 
 n Work With Police    Alert Police 
Very Low 71         39%         41% 
Medium Low 69         43%         43% 
Medium High 83         51%         57% 
Very High 68         63%         58% 
Difference        +24 pts (+ 62%)       +17 pts (+41%) 
(Respondents grouped by perceptions of fairness in enforcement.) 
 
 
One somewhat unexpected finding is that willingness to work with 
police in anti-terror initiatives is only modestly affected by fairness in the 
formation of policy but is extremely sensitive to fairness in enforcement.  In 
contrast, willingness to alert the police decreases in response to both sorts 
of unfairness, but in the reverse order: it is much more sensitive to whether 
overall policies are established fairly.  We suspect that because working 
with the police is local and personal, willingness to do so is more strongly 
driven by the trustworthiness of officials nearby than by large questions of 
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policy, such as the decision whether to maintain a detention camp at 
Guantánamo Bay.  Conversely, willingness to report suspicious activity 
seems more likely to be affected by respondents’ perceptions of overall 
systemic fairness: how such information will be processed by higher 
officials and how fairly suspects will be treated once they come to law 
enforcement attention.  If so, it makes sense that willingness to report 
would be very sensitive to perceived fairness of the system as a whole but 
less affected by respondents’ trust in officials with whom they and their 
neighbors interact in the neighborhood. 
Dynamics of this sort can of course be explored in considerably greater 
detail.  But the existing research is already ample to establish our two 
central points.  First, apart from any civil liberties considerations, tough 
measures that skirt traditional conceptions of due process take a substantial 
toll on law enforcement effectiveness.  And second, procedural justice 
concerns accordingly should be allotted a central place in all efforts to 
design and implement counterterrorism policy.  As in other contexts, 
sensitivity to procedural justice serves to promote rather than impair the 
security effort. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This is an ideal moment to reconsider the principles that guide 
American policing.  If we can adopt policing styles that communicate 
respect and nurture public trust, we can address the central concerns of both 
minority and majority populations. 
Research consistently shows that whites and minorities want the same 
thing from the police: fair treatment.  Minorities are, however, more apt to 
say that historically they have been treated unfairly and that they do not 
receive fair treatment even now.  This perceived unfairness leads to lower 
legitimacy ratings, less deference to the law among minorities, and lower 
levels of cooperation with the police. 
Addressing these concerns involves reframing the way we think about 
the goals of policing, in the context of both counterterrorism and ordinary 
law enforcement.  At all levels, government agencies must pay attention to 
public judgments about how they exercise their authority because such 
judgments shape the behaviors that are of primary importance to the police, 
in particular the willingness of individuals to obey the law and their 
willingness to cooperate in efforts to enforce the law against others. 
